One of the questions did not allow for my metaphysical position. I did not agree with any of the buttons and I could only comment at the very end of the survey.  I was required by the survey form to choose between some belief in God or else reject anything unphysical.

The definition of physical does not extend far enough to cover the realm of contradictions, and it can not reasonably be extended that far.  Symbolism and the range of unrealized possibilities are usually not considered to be physical although they are not thereby rejected out of mind.  But symbolism should be included in a mature nonclassical physics, and, it may be that an argument could yet force a place for the unrealized in nonclassical physics.

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Michael J. Burns

Michael, thanks for the feedback. I’m not sure what you mean by “the realm of contradictions.” How can “symbolism” or “unrealized possibilities” be considered apart from their existence as mental constructs grounded in our physical brain?

Symbolism, unrealized possibilities, and the various mathematics are not unique to the human brain, but are candidates in waiting for inclusion into a more mature physics.  But, contradictions, fiction and the inexpressible are outside of standard physics by a definition that is necessary for most logical work.

These last are only experienced in the symbolic realm by physical humans.  But, the first are perfectly well handled in emulation mode by computers, and not just by computers but by the physical world at large.  Else, how could humans themselves handle symbols?  There is no magic enabler for the human brain, and likewise there is no cosmic censor to prevent the treatment of symbolism in physics.

This line of thought might seem unfamiliar but it is is just an extension of the work of Spinoza.

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Michael J. Burns

mburns - 10 December 2007 02:46 AM

Symbolism, unrealized possibilities, and the various mathematics are not unique to the human brain, but are candidates in waiting for inclusion into a more mature physics.  But, contradictions, fiction and the inexpressible are outside of standard physics by a definition that is necessary for most logical work.

I would argue differently.  Mathematics doesn’t have an actual physical existence other than as a mental construct. There is no physical object corresponding to a derivative, for example.  Likewise for symbolism.  Symbols may exist outside of human brains, but only by existing in non-human brains (chimpanzees seem to be capable of symbolism, probably some other species too), but symbols don’t have a concrete, independent existence, by definition.  And the inexpressible, also by definition, is meaningless.  Not that it doesn’t exist, but that it has no meaning, so it can’t be described, and can’t be included into any sort of physics until it becomes described.  At which point it’s no longer inexpressible.

-Chuck

These last are only experienced in the symbolic realm by physical humans.  But, the first are perfectly well handled in emulation mode by computers, and not just by computers but by the physical world at large.  Else, how could humans themselves handle symbols?  There is no magic enabler for the human brain, and likewise there is no cosmic censor to prevent the treatment of symbolism in physics.

This line of thought might seem unfamiliar but it is is just an extension of the work of Spinoza.

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Michael J. Burns

Derivatives have a geometric meaning.  And, computers have no difficulty processing symbolic sequences and translating them into physical action; it is their essence to do so.  Humans are not an exception to this property of physics, and also are not exempt from would-be restrictions on symbolism.  The range of expression of the concept of symbolism is not naturally restricted to the human brain. Only a cosmic censor could make that restriction, but that could not be from other considerations..

Geometry is not very symbolic, and so it has a convincing claim to exist “out there” rather than just in the human brain.

And on the other hand, it is Jausch who has academic priority on the notion that quantum states are a sort of categorical proposition.  When geometry fails in its scope of expression, a more potent brew of symbolic mathematics takes over.

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Michael J. Burns

mburns - 10 December 2007 11:54 PM

Derivatives have a geometric meaning. 

They have a meaning, but that doesn’t necessarily translate to an independent existence.  “Atom” has meaning, and represents something that exists independently in the physical sense, but the word only has that meaning because we agree on what that particular combination of symbols represents.  If, at some long-ago time, somebody had decided that the smallest particle of matter that retains the properties of a pure element was called an “asdfghjkl”, then that combination of symbols would represent something other than the second line of keys on the keyboard.  The particles themselves would still exist, but the word “atom” would probably have a different meaning, or none at all.  “Derivatives” have a geometric meaning, but only because Newton and Liebniz invented a means of manipulating symbols that described processes that happen in the real world.  Derivatives are conceptual descriptions, but in themselves, they don’t have an independent physical existence.

And, computers have no difficulty processing symbolic sequences and translating them into physical action; it is their essence to do so.

Only because we’ve designed them to do so.  The symbols that the computer recognizes are, physically, nothing more than electrical potentials.  We (well, somebody) have designed the computers so that patterns of those potentials have symbolism - to us.  The computers couldn’t care less.

Humans are not an exception to this property of physics, and also are not exempt from would-be restrictions on symbolism.  The range of expression of the concept of symbolism is not naturally restricted to the human brain. Only a cosmic censor could make that restriction, but that could not be from other considerations..

I’m sorry, I don’t follow this.

Geometry is not very symbolic, and so it has a convincing claim to exist “out there” rather than just in the human brain.

Geometry is entirely symbolic.  All mathematics is.  It’s a description of what we see in the natural world, but it’s not the thing in itself.  I can draw two parallel lines with a piece of paper and a pencil, but there’s nothing inherent in those lines that says that they extend infinitely far and will never intersect (unless it’s non-Euclidian geometry).  I can draw a circle, and find that the circumference divided by diameter is equal to 3.14159265..... but that particular number doesn’t actually have a physical existence.  I only obtain it by manipulating symbols which represent a couple of physical qualities of a circle.

And on the other hand, it is Jausch who has academic priority on the notion that quantum states are a sort of categorical proposition.  When geometry fails in its scope of expression, a more potent brew of symbolic mathematics takes over.

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Michael J. Burns

I’ll take your word for it about Jausch.  But I stand by my assertion that mathematics is a symbolic representation of the physical world, and does not have an independent physical existence in itself.  An electron exists, but we use the symbols and the conventions of quantum physics to describe it’s existence.  That description may or may not be accurate, but it has no independent existence, and it is not the electron itself.

-Chuck

You indeed have a stand.  The philosopher Lakoff has a stronger version when he writes that physics is the romance of mathematics, that the physical world has regularities but that they can not be captured by mathematical expressions with more than the strength of mere convention.

Your stand and Lakoff’s should be so bold as to allow testing, compare results to a Spinozist project, which puts mathematics “out there”. A Spinozist project leads to verdicts on theoretical speculations even before experimental testing; some pronouncements even from Harvard can be seen as silly.  In other words, even Spinoza is testable.

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Michael J. Burns

I must allow that mathematics in a different language is still the same mathematics, whether English, Spanish or physics itself.  Spinozist realism is the great hypothesis that translations are possible, more than just conventional. And, this turns out to be testable by way of the particular theories that are compatible with Spinoza’s work.

When geometers draw a line, it is a line rather than a symbol.  That is why geometry is rhetorically significant here.

Computers can be made to “care” about mathematics.  More than twenty years ago, a programmed “mathematician” realized that prime numbers are interesting.  Motivation is programmable, and not by some hovering spirit of the programmer, nor is explicit command needed for every detail.

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Michael J. Burns

mburns - 12 December 2007 04:58 AM

I must allow that mathematics in a different language is still the same mathematics, whether English, Spanish or physics itself.  Spinozist realism is the great hypothesis that translations are possible, more than just conventional. And, this turns out to be testable by way of the particular theories that are compatible with Spinoza’s work.

When geometers draw a line, it is a line rather than a symbol.  That is why geometry is rhetorically significant here.

Computers can be made to “care” about mathematics.  More than twenty years ago, a programmed “mathematician” realized that prime numbers are interesting.  Motivation is programmable, and not by some hovering spirit of the programmer, nor is explicit command needed for every detail.

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Michael J. Burns

A line is a line - a physical mark on whatever medium it’s been drawn on.  It has physical existence, and it can be verified.  No arguments there.  But it’s what happens to the line after that where the geometry comes in.  From that point, any manipulation of symbolic representations of the line - the mathematics - is purely abstraction and does not have an independent physical existence.  That’s my point.

And computers can’t be made to “care” about anything.  As inanimate objects, they can only do what they are programmed to do - no more, no less.  A human mathematician might think that prime numbers are interesting, and then he’ll program his computer to work with them.  But without that programming, his computer is an expensive conglomeration of metals, metalloids, and plastics taking up space on his desk.  The non-biological computer is not motivated - the biological programmer is.  And from what I know of programming (admittedly, not much), an explicit command at some level is indeed needed for every detail of a computer program, if you expect it to work the way you want it to.